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Abstract: The growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) offers numerous opportunities for developing
industrial applications such as smart grids, smart cities, smart manufacturers, etc. By utilising
these opportunities, businesses engage in creating the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). IoT is
vulnerable to hacks and, therefore, requires various techniques to achieve the level of security
required. Furthermore, the wider implementation of IIoT causes an even greater security risk than
its benefits. To provide a roadmap for researchers, this survey discusses the integrity of industrial
IoT systems and highlights the existing security approaches for the most significant industrial
applications. This paper mainly classifies the attacks and possible security solutions regarding IoT
layers architecture. Consequently, each attack is connected to one or more layers of the architecture
accompanied by a literature analysis on the various IoT security countermeasures. It further provides
a critical analysis of the existing IoT/IIoT solutions based on different security mechanisms, including
communications protocols, networking, cryptography and intrusion detection systems. Additionally,
there is a discussion of the emerging tools and simulations used for testing and evaluating security
mechanisms in IoT applications. Last, this survey outlines several other relevant research issues and
challenges for IoT/IIoT security.
Keywords: internet of things security; communication protocol; networking; intrusion detection;
attacks and countermeasures
1. Introduction
IoT-connected devices are predicted to expand to 75 billion by 2025 [1]. Though these
devices enhance people’s lives and improve the efficiency of businesses, they also in-
crease the likelihood of vulnerability to attacks from hackers and cybercriminals. IoT
technology-enabled devices and components are finding their way into every sphere of
work interdependently. A functional disruption to one of these components will severely
impact the operations of other interdependent components. There are increasing concerns
by experts and policy-makers regarding protecting information and IT infrastructure from
these attacks. People, process and technology enterprise constituents are the prime targets
of cyber-sabotages. The industrial systems’ security has becomes a paramount concern
for all organisations across the industries [2]. Most industrial control systems (ICS) are
upgraded legacy systems with connectivity issues that are susceptible to potential attacks.
They were not designed for such connectivity, so there is a need to upgrade their security
designs. This is being made possible due to the increasing popularity of the Internet of
Things, which connects every piece of equipment to the internet to facilitate the commu-
nication and management of the pieces of hardware. The result is that increasingly more
industrial control systems are interconnected with each other and to the internet, drastically
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increasing the amount and scale of cyberattack vectors. Key to the successful application of
IoT to the industry is to enable real-time monitoring of the network infrastructure and its
associate service operations to support the automation of data delivery to achieve secure
and high-quality services [3].
Figure 1 demonstrates a high-level architecture of IoT and industrial IoT consisting
of four components: devices and equipment, networks, cloud and applications. Clearly,
as shown in Figure 1, there are four layers: the Perception layer, the Network layer, the Pro-
cessing Layer and the Application layer [4]. The Perception layer is comprised of numerous
kinds of sensors, security cameras, robots, etc. This inventory of machines can be found in an
industrial environment, where they could be followed by equipment like industrial robots,
automated guided vehicles (AGVs) and other equipment. These devices gather sensory data,
track environmental factors and transport raw materials [4,5]. The Network layer may have
different kinds of connectivity networks, including WiFi/IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth, LoRa,
6LoWPAN and NarrowBand-IoT, and they are responsible for relaying information to the
processing systems of the following layer. The industrial Ethernet establishes the base for
this layer, which transmits data either to the cloud or to other computers [4,5]. The Pro-
cessing layer consists of databases and servers and carries out many operations, such
as decision-making, refining computation algorithms and storing large volumes of data.
The Application layer manages and ensures the meeting of the application-specific needs
of the end user. Some significant IoT/IIoT applications include smart homes, smart robots,
smart healthcare and vehicle ad-hoc network (VANET), while smart grid, automation
and smart factory warehousing are known as IIoT applications [4,5].

































Figure 1. High-level IoT/IIoT architecture.
IoT and IIoT applications are crucial to the support of services and sensitive data in-
frastructures. The amount of data generated will increase with applications for healthcare,
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household and industrial use [6]. According to the authors of [7], approximately 70% of the
most frequently used IoT devices are vulnerable to several types of attacks. These attacks
include eavesdropping, replay attacks, Denial of Service (DoS)/Distributed DoS (DDoS),
sybil and blackhole attacks. For example, in 2016, the DNS provider that supported the
internet services and platforms, including PayPal, VISA and Twitter, was attacked by DDoS
through the vulnerabilities of IoT devices such as IP cameras, Printers and residential
gateways that were infected by malware named Miria [8]. Basic security services such as
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability and non-repudiation should be appro-
priate to guarantee IoT protection. However, IoT devices are constrained by their power
and memory. For example, objects and devices communicate together in a complicated way
by using different security mechanisms. Therefore, security difficulties have become a con-
cern when employing an appropriate security strategy that considers all those limitations.
Even though there have been numerous surveys in this field, these surveys, as outlined in
the following two sections are limited and primarily focused on either specific IoT security
aspect, attacks, layer vision or provide a limited evaluation of the implemented security
solutions. This paper aims to present a compact survey in one manuscript evaluating
the attacks, countermeasures, simulations and tools, and analysing the security solutions
commonly implemented. This paper’s major contributions include the integrity of the
industrial IoT systems, which has been highlighted along with a case study discussing
the existing security solutions for an important industrial IoT application, the smart grid.
Furthermore, the taxonomy of IoT layers, attacks and security countermeasures have been
presented, followed by a critical analysis of their practical implementation in previous
IoT security solutions focusing specifically on IoT layers. Some of the simulation tools
and operating systems (OS) used to investigate security solutions have been presented.
Finally, some of the limitations and highlighted recommendations for future work have
been discussed.
2. Related Surveys and Contribution
Currently, IoT/(IIoT) security and privacy surveys have been quite sparse. The exiting
surveys on IIoT system integrity were highlighted in the subsections and followed by
surveys on IoT system integrity. Then, how the broad objectives of previous surveys differ
from this survey has been clarified.
2.1. Surveys on System Integrity for IIoT
The growing popularity of applying IoT in various industries enables the interconnec-
tion of anything, anywhere and any time in the industry system context. Several studies
have been highlighted industrial IoT privacy, security issues and challenges. Nowadays,
embedded devices are commonly used in various domains like vehicles, household appli-
ances, smart grids, aerospace/defence applications, etc. These embedded devices require
secure and efficient authenticated encryption that satisfies a variety of resource constraints.
The study in [9] presents several lightweight algorithms schemes that can be used for
embedded systems for providing integrity and confidentiality. The study compares the
impact of different lightweight authenticated encryption schemes in terms of performance,
including latency, energy consumption and throughput. Key establishment techniques are
one of the countermeasures that ensure IIoT’s security and privacy. A comprehensive study
in [10] discussed the symmetric and asymmetric key establishment protocols built at the
higher layers and the physical layer; they then outline the importance of developing cross-
layer key establishment protocols for the IIoT by examining traditional key establishment
protocols. The authors provide an analysis in which the cross-layer architecture allows IIoT
devices to create communication keys without the need for a trusted person or the assump-
tion of secret sharing. Another study by Sadeghi et al. [11] proposed a systematic analysis
of IIoT systems and their security and privacy challenges, including security threats, attack
surfaces and security requirements. They highlight potential solutions towards a holistic
security approach to industrial IoT, such as protection design, integrity testing and device
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management security. A brief history of the industrial internet, its architecture and en-
abling technologies have been presented in [12]. The study presents various domains for
industrial internet application to demonstrate how the integration of industrial internet
technologies will transform traditional industries like health care, manufacturing, smart
grid and transportation. The study also highlights research challenges and open issues to
achieve scalable, safe, secure and interoperable industrial systems. In another work, the
authors of [13] detailed some of the vulnerabilities and threats associated with different
layers of IIoT. The study also introduces new security challenges and risks to IIoT. Another
study in [14] classified the security issues in IIoT systems into two categories: those that
apply to both IoT and IIoT, and those that are unique to industrial systems. Finally, the
authors of [15] discuss an in-depth overview of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system architectures, followed by attacks on the SCADA and outlines the security
requirements for SCADA systems. The authors provide a comprehensive analysis of the
applied intrusion detection systems on SCADA.
2.2. Surveys on IoT System Integrity
There have been numerous surveys conducted on various aspects of IoT systems’
security challenges and proposed solutions. A study in [16] discusses the relevant security
solutions of the IoT system model regarding confidentiality, integrity and authentication.
The study focuses on security issues related to middleware and mobile devices. Other
surveys in [17,18] classifies the security issues of the IoT systems model through specific
threats. The study also highlights some of the security solutions’ IoT communication
protocol and describes the appropriate protection designed to consider the technological
heterogeneity and limited resources of the IoT paradigm. A comprehensive survey in [19]
analyses and discusses countermeasures to the possible IoT threats. Individually, the sur-
vey evaluates the threats to each layer on the risk assessment in a model-based manner.
The survey focuses only on the weakness of the communication protocols, while security
issues investigated in [20] examined the IoT protocols included in the Message Authen-
tication Code (MAC) and the physical layer. The study focuses only on the physical and
MAC layer communication. The authors of [21,22] discuss a summary of the security chal-
lenges associated with the deployment of smart IoT objects. Then, the authors discussed
numerous security protocols at the application, transport and network layers, such as Data-
gram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), Host Identity Protocol (HIP) and Internet Protocol
Security IPSec. Moreover, they discuss how the combined cryptography algorithms and
the lightweight algorithms utilised in IoT, included in the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) scheme and some of the hash functions, the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
(RSA) scheme, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm and the Tiny Encryption
Algorithm (TEA) cipher. In [23], a discussion of cryptography algorithms that impact
the IoT has been offered. Due to the IoT devices’ resources constrained to memory and
processing capabilities, the authors of [24] present a comparison of lightweight algorithms
implemented on different software tools and hardware. The improved results of the imple-
mented algorithms change from the application to the software platform. Moreover, they
reported that lightweight algorithms are the most crucial aspect used in IoT to enhance
security and reduce power and memory consumption. Furthermore, they highlighted a
lightweight classification based on their function, which includes hash functions, stream
ciphers and block ciphers. A comprehensive survey of IoT’s current vulnerabilities and
security threats based on its architecture, communication and application is presented
in [25]. The authors also proposed a potential solution to mitigate the weaknesses and
threats to the IoT environment. In [26], the authors proposed a survey mainly focused on
the security and privacy issues of IoT applications in smart cities. The authors also analysed
work that was carried out regarding securing smart cities. The work in [27] classified the
IoT security roadmap was based on a cognitive and systematic method. It highlighted
the security issues included in (i) data privacy, (ii) trust and (iii) identification and those
in the authentication of smart manufacturing as a case study. A comprehensive study is
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presented in [28] that highlights the vulnerabilities and solutions related to privacy in IoT.
On the other hand, the authors of [29] reviewed the characteristics of IoT. Moreover, they
discussed DoS/DDoS attacks against the IoT networks and the MAC layer. Additionally,
the authors analysed the mechanisms used for mitigating the DoS/DDoS attacks within IoT
networks, such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). The authors of [30] propose a survey
highlighting recent IoT security studies from 2016 to 2018. The study discusses the security
issues related to encryption, trust and authentication. From the discussion in Section 2,
it is clear that much work has been done in this field. However, the studies mentioned
above are limited and mainly focused on specific IoT security aspects, attacks, layers, and a
limited evaluation of the existing security solutions. Therefore, there is still a need for a
compact survey on most existing IoT/IIoT security attacks, solutions and countermeasures.
To conclude, this paper will provide the reader with a full picture and understanding of
the state-of-the-art IoT/IIoT security attacks, solutions and countermeasures. The paper
also highlights some of the simulation tools and operating systems (OS) used to investi-
gate security solutions. Compared with the survey papers discussed in the literature, our
significant contributions are highlighted and summarised in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of relevant surveys.
Ref Year Objective Comparison with Our Survey
[16] 2019 Highlights the relevant security solutions re-
garding the middle layer and mobile device
This survey highlights classifications of security
attacks and countermeasures in respect to each
layer of IoT/IIoT layers
[17] 2015 Analyses and discusses the security issues
of the IoT layers
This survey provides a critical evaluation of the
existing security issues and countermeasures re-
garding IoT/IIoT layers
[18] 2018 Highlights the security and issues of the
IoT layers
This survey presents a comprehensive evaluation
of the security issues, attacks and solutions with
respect to the IoT/IIoT layers
[19] 2019 Analyses the possible threats to the commu-
nication protocols on each layer
This study highlights the IIoT system integrity
along with a case study discussing the existing
security solutions for the important industrial IoT
application of smart grids
[20] 2015 Investigates the security and issues re-
lated to the MAC layer and physical layer,
IEEE802.15.4
This survey highlights classifications of security
attacks and countermeasures with respect to each
IoT/IIoT layer
[21] 2018 Reviews the most used cryptography algo-
rithms on the IoT constrained deceives
This survey overviews various security solutions
approaches mapped to each IoT/IIoT layer
[22] 2017 Details the various types of IoT application
and discuss security and privacy in the IoT
This survey highlights classifications of security
attacks and countermeasures mapped to each
IoT/IIoT layer
[23] 2018 Highlights an appropriate cryptography al-
gorithm covering the aspects of energy con-
sumption and execution time
This survey reviews various security solutions
approaches mapped to each layer of IoT/IIoT
layer with their corresponding countermeasure
proposed in the literature
[24] 2019 Examine and compare several lightweight
algorithms that implemented on different
tools and software
This work presents lightweight and non-
lightweight algorithms and their possible so-
lutions proposed in the literature.
[25] 2017 Compare possible attacks on IoT in the
aspects of communication and application
architecture
This survey highlights a comprehensive evalua-
tion of the security issues, attacks and solutions
with respect to each IoT/IIoT layer
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Table 1. Cont.
Ref Year Objective Comparison with Our Survey
[26] 2017 Analyse the security issues in IoT applica-
tion based on smart cities
This survey reviews various security solutions ap-
proaches mapped to each layer of IoT layers with
their corresponding countermeasure proposed in
the literature
[27] 2018 Discuss the security and issues related to
data privacy, trust and identification and
authentication: uses smart manufacturing
as case study
This study highlights system integrity of each
layer of IoT/IIoT along with a case study
discussing the existing security solutions for
the most important industrial IoT application,
the smart grid
[28] 2019 Highlights the vulnerabilities and solutions
related to the privacy and routing attacks,
mainly DoS
This survey highlight classifications of security at-
tacks and countermeasures mapped to each layer
of IoT/IIoT layers
[29] 2018 Highlights the characteristic of IoT and dis-
cuss the D/DoS attacks targeting the net-
work and MAC layer
This survey highlights a comprehensive evalua-
tion of the security issues, attacks and solutions
with respect to IoT/IIoT layers
[30] 2019 Highlights and discusses the recent stud-
ies in the IoT security and issues from 2016
to 2018
This survey highlights a comprehensive evalua-
tion of the security issues, attacks and solutions
with respect to IoT/IIoT layers
Our Con-
tribution
- - IIoT system integrity has been highlighted along
with a case study discussing the existing security
solutions for for an important IoT application,
the smart grid; the taxonomy of IoT layers, at-
tacks, and security countermeasures have been
presented; provides a critical analysis of the prac-
tical implementation regarding IoT/IIoT; high-
lights several simulation tools and operating sys-
tems (OS) used to investigate security solutions;
discusses potential future research directions
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the background
surveys and highlights our contribution with regard to the existing surveys. Section 3
highlights the industrial IoT systems integrity as well as some of the existing studies of
industrial application of smart grids. Section 4 presents the IoT layers with their corre-
sponding security attacks and solutions. Section 5 presents the necessary security services
and discusses standardised security solutions. Section 6 highlights the test bed tools that
are used in IoT research. Section 7 discusses the existing studies’ solutions and provides a
critical analysis of these studies. Section 8 presents open research directions, and finally
Section 9 concludes the paper.
3. Industrial IoT System Integrity
ICS is designed to support industrial processes. Several operations and processes,
such as distributed energy resources, water treatment or transportation control, are tracked
and managed by these systems. ICS systems are (formally) SCADA (supervisory control
and data acquisition). ISC has moved away from proprietary, individual systems linked
only to integrated and Internet-based standardised technology that exists in a short pe-
riod. Furthermore, ICS-based products are most frequently found in various consumer
or industrial devices such as routers or cable modems, which typically use commercial
off-the-the-shelf software [31]. However, ICS are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks
and insider threats in industrial applications. Industrial applications should be protected
from system and data integrity attacks in order to improve system security. Threats to
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systems and information integrity could disrupt critical manufacturing programs, reduce
productivity and endanger safety and impact business activities. Industrial IoT is gradually
becoming common due to its operational application in different areas [32]. As a result, var-
ious security vulnerabilities and threats that arise specifically with IIoT applications have
been discovered. In the following subsection, the study addresses the existing solutions
based on the smart grid application.
Case Study on IIoT Application: Smart Grid
The term “Smart Grid” refers to an enhanced energy supply chain that extends from a
large power plant to our homes and businesses. The fundamental premise of the smart
grid is to enhance the nation’s electrical distribution infrastructure with tracking, review,
control and communication capabilities in order to optimise system throughput while
minimising energy consumption. The idea of the smart grid is implemented to facilitate
its implementation. Despite the many advantages obtained from conventional networks,
the smart grid has been exposed to a number of vulnerabilities and attacks [33]. This
paper highlights some of the current research being conducted to address the availability,
integrity and confidentiality of smart grid infrastructures’ communication and control sys-
tem. The main security issues facing users of the smart grid connection users are consumer
privacy, confidentiality and maintaining the integrity of energy consumption. A security
protocol is developed for the smart grid using different double auction mechanisms and
homomorphic encryption [34]. This protocol provides authentication, security as well as
compatibility to the smart grid technologies. It assigns pseudo-identity to each consumer in
the smart grid and ensures the anonymity of consumers during communication. However,
the homomorphic encryption schemes in [34,35] generate a lengthy cipher-suit than the
plain text, resulting in a large delay for encryption and decryption. A lightweight authenti-
cation and key agreement are suggested in [36] for a smart metering network. It exploits
hybrid cryptography, i.e., Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and a symmetric key for
providing security. Before applying cryptography, both gateway and smart meters are
authenticated mutually. The hybrid cryptography-based security scheme protects against
many attacks, but it lacks in focusing on many privacy features, such as unforgeability and
undetectability. Several ECC-based authentication schemes [37,38] have been proposed
for the smart grid network. However, they do not satisfy all the security features in the
smart grid. A pairing scheme between smart meters and server is an expensive operation,
and it does not apply to smart meters with low power. In [39], a Certificate-Less Two-Party
Authenticated Key Agreement (CL2PAKA) scheme is suggested for smart grid applications.
The CL2PAKA does not need to perform any pairing operation, and it implements only
four scalar multiplication operations on ECC. The main disadvantage of a certificate-less
authentication schemes [39,40] is that the identity information cannot provide a public key
for a long time. That means the identity of consumers alone is not sufficient to provide a
public and secret key. In [41], a privacy-preserving architecture is suggested for the smart
grid using a Q-learning-based optimised approach. It exploits the cryptography technique
to outsource multiregional electricity data securely. It implements three dynamic proto-
cols to perform primary operations in Q-learning—Q value updation, Q-learning training
and knowledge replaying with encrypted packet information. However, it consumes more
time to reach an optimal value, and so it is less applicable to resource-constrained smart
grid applications.
It is clear that the existing works mostly apply either symmetric or asymmetric encryp-
tion schemes. The former technique has to share the secret key in advance, and the latter
does not need to set a shared key in advance. However, the latter technique consumes
more computational cost than the former encryption technique. Therefore, it is an effective
method to generate a shared key and encrypt the data. For smart grid application, it is
important to provide an effective authentication and security scheme in a lightweight
manner. As smart meters in advanced metering infrastructure are low energy devices, high
complex security schemes are not applicable to smart meters.
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4. Classification of Security Attacks
IoT includes a wide range of devices and equipment ranging from small embedded
devices and even advanced large servers. There is a need to highlight the security issues
at different IoT layers. Figure 2 shows a classification of IoT security issues along with
the security solutions for each of the IoT layers. The most common IoT layer architecture
is divided into three layers: perception, network, and the application layer. These three
layers contain a large range of information with various enabling features and technologies.






















































Figure 2. Classification of IoT layers, threats and security approaches.
4.1. Perception Layer with Security Attacks
The perception or device layer includes objects with attached sensors, smart meters,
robots, cameras, etc. The perception layer identifies and collects the target sensor data,
for example, related to movements, vibrations, chemicals in the atmosphere, heat, orien-
tation, humidity or acceleration. These data are sent to the network layer and then to an
information processing system [42].
Node Capture Attacks: These attacks involve attackers capturing/replacing a node
or modifying hardware, exposing sensitive data for the management of digital rights, such
as access/cryptography keys. Replacement nodes may then act maliciously, making the
whole IoT network insecure [43].
Malicious Code Injection Attack: Malicious codes are injected within the node’s
memory via its debug modules. These codes can carry out undesirable activities and may
allow an attacker to access the entire network. Attacks generally occur when upgrading
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software/firmware through over-the-air (OTA). When devices are in the operating mode
(e.g., during a scheduled firmware update), an intruder may insert Trojans into the machine
(requires device reboot). The security challenge, in this case, is divided into two categories:
proper authentication, identification of an edge device in the network and making sure
that drivers or malware are not installed on peripheral devices in the name of updates and
upgrades [43].
Sleep Deprivation Attack: Sleep deprivation attacks resemble denial-of-service at-
tacks, as they drain the edge device’s batteries, while these devices are usually intended
for low-power operation. Consumption is increased by making hardware modifications or
injecting infinitely-looping codes into the memory [43].
Jamming attack: These attacks interfere with the tag reader air interface, disrupting
communications or altering communications. Jamming is done through a long-distance,
powerful transmitter or passively, for example, through shielding, which can succeed due
to the sensitivity of the interface. RFID systems can be jammed through radio noise which
matches the system’s frequency [44].
Replay attack: This type of attack involves repeating of an authentication code used
by an authorised individual, either by cloning the authorised tag or sending a signal again
after eavesdropping on signals sent by a device with the correct antenna and card. Replay
attacks require specific data which the tag sends in communications [44].
4.2. Network Layer with Security Attacks
The network layer is responsible for transmitting data to and from various things
or applications through interfaces or gateways between heterogeneous networks and via
a variety of communication technologies and protocols. The network layer receives the
processed data from the perception layer and determines the routes for transmitting it to
the IoT devices, hub and gateway through integrated networks [45].
Selective-Forwarding Attacks: These attacks are DoS attacks. Only selected packets
are forwarded by malicious nodes and aim to disrupt the route of the path, although any
protocol could be targeted. Thus, attackers might forward every RPL control message while
dropping all other packets. When combined with a sinkhole or other attacks, selective
forwarding can be highly damaging [45].
Eavesdropping attack: This type of attack relies on the signal sent out by RFID tags
when required by RFID readers, through eavesdropping on this signal being sent to an
RFID reader with authorisation to identify the frequency and tag group used. Clear text is
used by the majority of RFIDs based on cost and memory limitations, and this allows the
eavesdropping to succeed [44].
Clone ID and Sybil Attacks: Clone ID attacks involve copying a legitimate node’s
identity to a second node for reasons such as accessing a greater proportion of a network
or counteracting vote schemes. Sybil attacks utilise a number of logical entities for one
physical node to control an extensive network area with no need for more nodes to be
used [45].
Wormhole Attack These attacks generally target traffic flows and network typologies.
Wormhole attacks are performed by producing a tunnel that links two attackers for the
selective transmission of traffic via this route [46].
Denial of Service (DoS): In denial of service or DoS attacks, a targeted network/
computation source is disrupted, potentially reducing capacity on the network. For IoTs,
DoS attacks can be Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) or a simple DoS attack. The simple
attack needs a tool for sending packets to crash or restart a system/network, while DDoS
may use one attacker with less force than a proxy. These attacks can disrupt and prevent
access to networks [47].
Man in the Middle attack: These attacks involves interception and alteration of
node-to-node communications, using a range of strategies. After the node–node link is
interrupted and the data altered in real-time, it can then be monitored by the attackers [48].
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Sinkhole Attack: Sinkhole attacks compromise nodes within a network and uses
these to transmit false routing data to adjacent nodes, claiming to have the shortest route
to the base and then dropping or modifying packets routed through them [49].
Blackhole Attack: These attacks involve a malicious node placed within the network
quietly dropping every packet routed through it by the network, with nothing being passed
on [46].
Spoofed, Alter, Replay Routing Information: Mutual direct attacks involve spoofing,
altering and replaying routing targeting routing data in node-to-node exchanges. Spoofing
attacks utilise issues due to the ability to detect an IoT device within a system, for example,
by producing a fake error message or producing a routing loop [47].
4.3. Application Layer with Security Attacks
The final layer in this novel architecture design is the application layer. This layer
formats and presents data and delivers a range of applications to diverse types of users,
defining different smart applications for the use of IoT, including smart health, homes, cities,
industries and transportation. This layer provides the user with a particular application
based on object sensor data [45]. Security is a central challenge in this layer, with frequent
issues arising, including the following.
Malicious Code Injection: These attacks exploit coding within the software, which
damages systems or leads to other unwanted impacts and can avoid detection by anti-virus
applications. The code may be self-activating or activated when the user takes a specific
action [48].
Malicious Scripts: these involve networks or IoT devices that are connected to the
Internet. The attack is carried out by running malicious codes or x-scripts which look like
legitimate scripts and which the user must access, to be data theft and systems failure [50].
Data distortion attack: these uses code within the software to damage systems or
lead to other unwanted impacts and avoid detection by anti-virus applications. The code
may be self-activating or activated when the user takes a specific action [50].
5. Connectivity and System Integrity Approaches
The IoT allows devices to share and transfer data among users and devices to accom-
plish specific goals. Therefore, security is intrinsic to the deployment of IoT due to the
sensitivity and connectivity of applications, such as military and defence, smart homes,
healthcare, and railway systems [16,51]. The following are the necessary security services
in IoT and industrial applications.
Confidentiality: It is crucial to ensure that the messages are secure and accessible
to only authorised objects because an intruder could catch the data flow between sender
and receiver, and confidential data could be exposed. Moreover, these data should be
unknown to intermediate users. In IoT, an object could be machines, devices, sensors,
and internal and external objects. For example, it is required in IoT that the end-to-end
message is secret. Furthermore, the data stored in the IoT device should be unobserved
from unauthorised users. Data confidentiality services are supported through mechanisms
such as encryption and decryption [52,53].
Integrity: It is important to ensure that data exchange between multiple IoT devices
is accurate. This means that the data comes from the right source and ensures the data
is not modified during the transmission [54]. For instance, the stored data of medical
patient should not be modified. The most useful protection for providing the integrity
service is Message Integrity Codes (MIC) and the hash function mechanism. Furthermore,
maintaining end-to-end security communication in IoT is crucial for integrity feature [55].
Authentication: It ensures that the data have sent from the right device and not
modified during the transmission. In communication, each object should be able to identify
as well as authenticate each other. Nevertheless, this process is very challenging due to the
nature of IoT; numerous objects included in people, devices, processing units, and services
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providers may be required to communicate with each other. Due to these requirements,
the authentication mechanism in every communication within IoT is necessary [56].
Availability: The vision behind IoT is to link as many devices as possible. Availability
ensures that all the data are available to the objects whenever they are needed. Nevertheless,
the data component is used in IoT, and devices and services should be available and
reachable whenever needed [57]. Besides, firewalls and IDSs are the most effective security
mechanisms which can be used to detect malicious activity and intrusions to ensure the
availability of services [58].
Lightweight solutions: Lightweight security is considered a unique feature due
to the power capabilities and computational speed of the IoT devices. A lightweight
solution should be considered through designing and executing protocols in the encryption
and authentication of IoT devices. Meanwhile, these algorithms can run with limited
capabilities on IoT devices [17,59].
Replay protection: A stored data packet in the intermediate node can be compromised
and replayed back later. The replayed data can comprise a sensor reading, for example,
temperature reading or blockchain transaction. It is crucial to provide a mechanism to detect
replay or duplicate messages. This can be accomplished through the nonce mechanism,
integrity-protected sequence number, or timestamp [60].
5.1. Communication Security
The communication in IoT must be preserved by the designated security mechanism
discussed in Section 5. Security can be provided at different layers by using the combined
Internet security solutions. Generally, the protection of the IoT communication can be
delivered through end-to-end security or intermediate devices [20]. The standardised IoT
stack with the standardised security solution at IoT layers is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. IoT stack based on the standardised security solutions.
IoT Layers Protocols Security Solution
Application layer CoAP, MQTT CoAPs, MQTTs
Transport layer UDP,TCP DTLS, TLS
Network layer IPv6, RPL IDS, Secure RPL, IPsec
Perception layer IEEE 802.14.5 IEEE 802.24.5 security
IEE802.15.4 security: Link-Layer level
The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol is widely used for short-range communication in the IoT
environment. It is specifically responsible for information transmission at the physical
and MAC layers. IEEE802.14.5 protocol is used as link-layer security in communication
networks such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN).
The link-layer provides secure communication on hop-by-hop to all the nodes in the net-
work. The specification of 802.15.4 outlines different security sets that can be included in
encryption and authentication (AES-CCM), encryption only (AES-CTR), authentication
only (AES-CBC- MAC), and no security. All the communication is protected through
the pre-shared key. The shared key must be secured because if the attacker gains the
key, the attacker can compromise the whole network [18]. Although the IEEE 802.15.4
protocol provides critical security services, it does have some limitations. More precisely,
it is incapable of safeguarding the privacy and confidentiality of acknowledgement mes-
sages (ACK).
LoRaWan Security
The long-range wireless area network (LoRaWan) was designed to enhance the func-
tionality of Low-Power Wide-Area Networks (LPWANs) in terms of power consumption,
storage, long-range communication and transmission cost. The four critical components of
its architecture are end nodes, gateways, network and applications servers. End nodes are
typically Internet of Things devices that gather data from their physical environment and
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transmit them to gateways through the LoRa physical layer. The gateways then transmit
this data to a network server. This can be carried out through IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), satellite,
IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet) or other systems. The network server is responsible for data control
by conducting necessary security operations and scanning for duplicate packets. It then
sends the information to application servers, which function as the foundation for software
applications [61]. Two layers of encryption are used in LoRaWan technology. The first
security layer is responsible for authenticating the data on the end nodes. This process is
performed between the end nodes and the network server using an AES-CTR 128 secret
key called the network session key. On the other hand, the second layer ensures that end
nodes’ privacy is protected by using an AES-CTR 128 secret key called the application
key between the end nodes and the application servers. As a consequence, the LoRaWaN
technology’s protection of these keys is important. If any secret key is compromised, a po-
tential attacker would have access to and alter the data. Additionally, when communicating
between end nodes and gateways, it is worth remembering that the length of the payload
remains constant before and after encryption. An attacker can exploit this by decryption
the encrypted messages and recovering the network session key [62].
IPsec: Network level
IPsec provides security for the network layer. IPsec provides end-to-end security,
which contains a number of protocols such as Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), which
ensures confidentiality and integrity, and the authentication header (AH), which ensures
authentication and integrity [63]. IPsec can be used with the IP-based protocols and a
transport layer such as User Datagram Protocol (UDP), Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP), Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).
IPsec is considered the most appropriate for end-to-end security for IoT because of the
default security policies that run on a constrained device [64]. Virtual Private Network
(VPN) technology is also considered the first line of protection for IoT networks. It enables
establishing a private and secure tunnel between communicating parties to safeguard the
exchanged data against tampering and passive and active intruders. Indeed, the tunnel
construction process begins with establishing a preparatory encrypted and stable tunnel,
and then the encryption keys and parameters are negotiated from inside that channel [65].
Besides IPSec and VPN, RPL provides security mechanisms to control messages. Even
though it is optional, the integrity of the authentication process and confidentiality of the
control message is guaranteed [29].
CoAP: Transport Layer
As mentioned above, in addition to the IPsec datagram, the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
or the transport layer security (TLS) is the most commonly used security protocol in web
protocols that run over TCP. Still, they are not efficient for use in communication with smart
objects in low-power wireless networks [29]. Another version of TLS is Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS), which runs over UDP. DTLS provides integrity, authentication and
confidentiality solutions. Besides, DTLS provides end-to-end security between applications
and transport layers. CoAP is an IoT web protocol, and DTLS is used as a security solution
for CoAP protocol [66,67].
5.2. Network Security
The network layer’s main task is addressing and routing data packets to integrate
countless devices into a single collaborative network seamlessly. The most common
network layer protocols include IPv4/IPv6, low-power and lossy (RPL) and 6LoWPAN
networks. Although the integrity and confidentiality services secure the messages within
the communication, several types of attacks are likely to be accrued on the networks,
significantly disrupting the availability of the security services [68]. Eavesdropping attacks
can analyse traffic transmitted over a network and affect the privacy of data. Therefore,
traffic is then vulnerable to various attacks, such as DoS, Man-in-the-Middle and illegal
access attacks. The DoS attacks can be launched to disrupt the networks. Furthermore,
the network layer of IoT is highly vulnerable to a MITM attack. The security of the
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communication will be exposed if the attacker gains access to the keying of the devices [69].
However, protecting the network in IoT is crucial in order to secure services such as
integrity, availability and confidentiality when transferring the information at the network
layer. firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and key management can be employed
to secure the network against the routing attacks such as sybil, rankhole, blackhole, clonID,
etc. [70]. 6LoWPAN networks are susceptible to attacks from both inside and outside the
network. As discussed above, some security solutions can protect the 6LoWPAN, such as
IPsec, 802.14.5 and the DTLS. Further to this, RPL networks are also vulnerable to routing
attacks aimed at disrupting the network. The specification of RPL defines various security
modes: “unsecured” RPL control messages; “pre-installed” RPL, in which nodes have
been configured with a symmetric key to generate a secured RPL message; and third,
“authenticated”, which are used to operate the device as a router. Or, finally, when a device
joins the network using both the pre-installed mode and the preconfigured key, every RPL
message has a protected variant, as well as AES/CCM procedures, which are utilised to
support integrity and confidentiality [18,71].
5.3. Application Security
There are numerous challenges to the application’s security because of the absence of
standards that control the communication and the development process of applications.
For instance, identity authentication and access permissions can be a reason for concern.
There are different IoT applications such as smart home, smart healthcare, smart city, etc.
For example, the smart home application can provide the air conditioning and tempera-
ture measurement to the client requesting such information. For applications of different
purpose for customers with widely varying needs, it is challenging to accomplish authenti-
cation and access permissions [6,51]. Data security is a major factor in the application layer.
In order to guarantee access privileges and data usage, data encryption and distortion
technologies are mostly used in the protection of the privacy of data. Furthermore, recovery
mechanisms and data backup must be implemented appropriately, as well as techniques to
protect data privacy should be properly selected, such as DNS, TLS, SSL, etc. [72,73].
6. Network Simulations and Operating Systems
Designing, developing and evaluating new IoT products and protocols prior to being
deployed on a specific environment demands testing and assessment using various tools.
For instance, prototyping may not be widespread when using a large number of device
nodes during the original exploratory design and evaluation phases, and this is because of
the economic and operational restrictions. This is especially the case when the reliability and
utility of the protocol under consideration have not yet been demonstrated. Additionally,
creating reliable, repeatable experiences that include real hardware can be complicated
and often require specific expertise and field knowledge. Thus, some simulators and
real operating systems (OS) offer a better choice for setting up reliable scenarios and
experiments. However, as mentioned earlier, testing, analysing and evaluating a real test
bed are costly and challenging. Therefore, simulators offer high accuracy for scenarios
involving heterogeneous elements, energy efficiency, scalability and low-cost [74]. This
section examines several simulators and operating systems that use in IoT research.
6.1. Simulators
The IoT paradigm predates network protocol research, and many previously avail-
able tools for WSN or basic networking research have been modified to include IoT-
specific elements. A comprehensive survey conducted in [75] highlighted approximately
21 open-source that have been used in IoT/IIoT. However, this paper mainly focuses on the
widespread use of these open-source simulators by academic and industrial user groups,
including Cooja, OMNeT++, NS-3 and QualNet3 SCADAsim.
Cooja is a simulator configured for emulating a network with sensor nodes and
supports several sensor motes included in Wismote, Sky, and Z1 motes, etc. Cooja enables
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synchronised simulations in three levels: machine code instruction, operating system
and application level. Therefore, the majority of protocols and standards implemented
through Contiki [76].
OMNeT++ is a network simulator for modelling communication networks, dis-
tributed and other parallel systems, or multiprocessors. OMNeT++ is open-source, discrete-
event, C++-based and can be used by education, academic and commercial institutions for
simulating distributed systems and computer networks [77].
NS-3 is a new open-source simulator that was developed to replace the old simulator
NS-2. It is a powerful tool for supporting network optimisation and modelling, includ-
ing internet-stack implementation module TCP/UDP/IPv4/IPv6 stack and NetDevice
operations such as IEEE802.15.4, CSMA and WiFi. It also supports the 6LoWPAN stack [78].
QualNet is a commercial simulation tool introduced by Scalable Network Technolo-
gies (SNT). It is a network software for large, distributed applications and heterogeneous
networks. It has an additional extension sensor network library that can be used for IoT
specific simulation, which supports the IEEE 802.15.4 networks [74,79].
SCADASim is open-source software that aims to provide a framework for rapidly
developing flexible SCADA system simulations. SCADASim is a discrete event simu-
lation engine built on top of OMNET++. The SCADASim architecture comprises three
primary components: SSScheduler, a real-time scheduler; SSGate, a communication port
that implements protocols for communication with the external environment; and SSProxy,
a simulation object that simulates an external component within the simulation environ-
ment. Additionally, it includes several tools for developing network typologies (the NED
language and editor) and a plug-in extension architecture. Plug-ins allow for customisation
of the default simulation engine’s actions. For instance, a simulation can be enhanced with a
different message scheduler, thus altering the default behaviour of message scheduling [80].
6.2. Operating Systems (OSs)
The IoT OS is well suited to IoT devices with low to moderate resource constraints.
Small IoT devices are highly specialised devices that place a strict restriction on IoT operat-
ing systems to be extremely hardware-specific with minimal capabilities. Medium-sized
IoT devices allow the inclusion of a full IP suite and various applications to run on top of
the network stack. Additionally, the devices have additional capabilities and can act as
servers, hosts or internet routers. Many aspects of OSs were designed for the IoT environ-
ment. However, this paper highlights some of these OSs, including TinyOS, Contiki OS,
Riot OS, Raspbian, mbeds and Zephyr. However, based on the literature analysis, the most
widely used OSs are Contiki OS and TinyOS.
TinyOS, designed for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), had been the most popular
operating system for public research for many years. Nevertheless, it has not been used
recently by researchers because of inactive development. TinyOS is an open-source OS de-
signed for wireless devices that are embedded and have low-power. It has a programming
language based on C called NESC (Network embedded system C). It also provides several
hardware platforms and supports the 6LoWPAN protocol through IPv6 stack [81].
ContikiOS is open-source and the most common operating system used for program-
ming IoT sensor nodes. Furthermore, it is used for multi-tasking and making the network
more efficient in terms of memory, wireless sensor systems and networks [74]. In addition
to this, Contiki supports IP connectivity for both IPv4 and IPv6. Contiki was developed by
a group led by Adam Dunkels at the Swedish Institute of Computer Science [82]. Contiki
supports many mechanisms and protocols, for example, RPL routing, application protocol
CoAP and MQTT, and 6LoWPAN header compression. Furthermore, Contiki provides a
power profiling mechanism named Powertrace, which keeps track of, and estimates the,
energy consumed by each sensor node [83].
Riot is a free, open-source operating system created by a grassroots group of busi-
nesses, academics and enthusiasts and is distributed worldwide. RIOT OS is compatible
with ARM Cortex-M3 and Cortex-M4 processors and ARM7, AVR Atmega and MSP430
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devices. This OS was written in C and C++ and is distributed under the LGPL v2.1 licence.
Gcc, valgrind and gdb are specific development tools that can be part of an SDK included
with RIOT OS. Additionally, the SDK architecture is compatible with C and C++ application
programming. RIOT is compatible with the vast majority of low-power IoT devices and
micro-controller architectures. RIOT OS is compatible with most common communication
and networking protocols, including IPv6, TCP, UDP, CoAP, 6LoWPAN and RPL [84].
Raspbian is the most common operating system used by researchers in IoT and IIoT
projects. It is a low-power, highly extendable, cheap and small board developed by the
Raspberry Foundation in the UK to be used for teaching and experimental projects. It runs
over a variety of Linux distributions and its primary Raspbian Debian-based operating
system. There are different varieties of Raspberry Pi available such as the Pi 3 Model B, Pi 2
Model B, Pi 1 Model A=, B+ and Pi Zero. The latest Pi 4 Model B launched in June 2019; it
has 1–4 GB RAM, uses a 1.5 GHz Quad-Core ARM Cortex-A72 CPU, integrated Bluetooth
5.0 and 802.11n wireless LAN [85].
MbedOS is a 32-bit ARM cortex-m micro-controller operating system developed by
ARM in collaboration with its technological partners ([29]). mbed OS is an open-source
operating system that can be used on a wide range of products, from small internet-
connected devices to smart cities and smart applications. The entire situation The operating
system is written in C and C++. The Apache License 2.0 governs this open-source operating
system. When compared to Microsoft’s or Google’s offerings. Device and Component
Support with real-time software execution and ease of use by any client are some of the key
features of the mbed OS, as are end-to-end Security and an extensive collection of drivers
and support libraries [84].
Zephyr is a real-time operating system designed for Internet of Things (IoT) applica-
tions that the Linux foundation backs. It is common among IoT experts due to the ease with
which it integrates with various IoT architectures. Zephyr’s interconnectivity technology is
one of the most distinguishing features. It is a library-based operating system with stable
memory security and a highly configurable, customised open-source IoT operating system
that supports device trees. 8 kb RAM and 512 kb ROM are needed to run this operating
system. It includes a device development kit with comprehensive documentation, a com-
prehensive set of kernel services, non-volatile storage, and virtual file support, among other
features [86].
7. Security Solutions for IoT and Industrial Systems
7.1. Communication Layer Security Solutions
Securing end-to-end communication in an IoT network is crucial. Compressed IP
security is proposed in [64] to enable-end to-end security within communications between
the traditional internet and the sensor network. Their security approach involves the Encap-
sulation Security Payload (ESP) and the Authentication Header (AH). It shows that their
compressed IPsec can check the integrity of messages by encrypting and authenticating
using standardised IPv6 mechanisms. Moreover, they extended their work in [87] detailing
ESP for IPsec/6LoWPAN, and then compared its solution with employing link-layer secu-
rity for IEEE802.15.4. The IPsec/6LoWPAN security and solution’s performance evaluation
testbed is built into IEEE 802.15.4, which re-utilised the crypto device through the actual
IEEE 802.15.4 transceivers for IPSec /6LoWPAN. Although the IPsec is better than link-
layer security for enhancing security and performs better according to the response time,
the IPsec consumes more energy than link-layer security. The authors of [88] proposed a
security analysis, access control improvements and authentication for the IoT. They offered
a practical protocol for IoT by breaking down current access control and authentication
approaches. An efficient, simple and secure key function based on ECC, the authentication
protocol is utilised to enhance device authentication. A Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
is proposed for the access control rule on IoT network applications. However, the practical
implementation of the proposed security valuation was not performed, and communication
overhead for the IoT sensor nodes was high.
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7.2. Network Routing Security Solutions
Although enabling the encryption and the authentication with messages, IoT networks
were still vulnerable to many attacks such as sybil, the black-hole attack, sinkhole, frag-
mentation attacks, selective-forwarding and the “man in the middle” attack. It is crucial
to design a system to detect these attacks. Many studies implemented intrusion detection
systems against attacks in WSN; however, some research performed IDS against an attack
in IoT. IDSs could be placed at every node of Low-power and Lossy Networks (LLN). Due
to the nodes being resources constrained, the IDS’s deployed in each physical object must
be optimised. The author of [89] have performed a lightweight intrusion detection against
malicious attack (DoS), which observes the energy consumption of the node when discov-
ering intrusions. They evaluate the impact of IDS on the sensor node’s energy consumption
during the attack, which revealed that higher energy was consumed during the attack
observed. However, the author does not show the detection accuracy of their IDS, and they
only use one metric and one type of attack. Due to the resource-constrained memory size
and computing power, the authors of [90] have proposed lightweight IDSs based on mali-
cious pattern detection. They evaluated their detection in terms of energy consumption and
execution time based on two schemes: early detection and auxiliary shifting to decrease the
number of matches required for discovering attacks. Although their approach enhances the
performance and accuracy faster than the Wu-Manber algorithm, the overhead of auxiliary
skipping (AS) was high due to the increase of the pattern. Another distributed IDS architec-
ture proposed in [91] called INTI (Intrusion detection for sinkhole attacks over 6LoWPAN
for Internet of Things) for sinkhole attacks. Their solution combined the approaches of
“watchdog” and “reputation and trust” for discovering and reducing attacks. INTI contains
four roles. First, nodes are categorised as a leader, in which the leader nodes receive
each node’s information state. Then, each node monitors the routing traffic. The third
is attacker detection. The last nodes are for isolating the attacker. The authors have not
analysed the impact of their solution on the resource-constrained nodes in terms of energy
consumption. Although they achieved a lower false-positive rate than in [92], it is still high
(29%). A hybrid intrusion detection system was proposed in [92] for IoT was called SVELTE.
SVELTE targets selective forwarding and sinkhole attacks. SVELTE consists of the main IDS
modules, a 6LoWPAN mapper and a mini-firewall at the constrained devices and border
router. Based on the requests sent by the border router to the client nodes, the client node
responds with information such as ID, parent ID and rank. SVELTE compares the collected
information to find any malicious traffic and notifying the border router. They claimed
that their proposed intrusion detection could be applied to anomaly detection techniques.
The best IDS result is to get a low false positive, low false negative and high true positive.
The SVELTE recorded a 90% true positive; however, the true positive rate decreases with
the increase of nodes, and there is a high false alarm rate (38%) during the detection of
malicious. In a similar study to SVELTE, the authors in [93] proposed network-based ID’s
that targeted wormhole attacks. Their IDS measures the collected, received signal strength
to identify the suspicious nodes. The results show that the true-positive rate was 90% when
the network size was small (eight nodes); however, there a significant decrease with the
increase in the network size. Furthermore, the authors only evaluated the impact of their
IDS in only one metric and one attack. IDS specification-based was proposed in [94] for
IoT. The proposed IDS works against repair and rank attacks. They also designed and
implemented distributed architecture to monitor all the nodes over an RPL limited state
machine. Even though they claimed that their proposed system could successfully detect
routing threats with a sensible overhead, the authors did not implement IDS and did not
specify the form of communication among monitoring nodes. Due to all monitoring nodes
need to store the ranks, preferred neighbouring nodes, and IDs. The finite state machine
was implemented on all monitoring nodes with an anomaly state to discover the attacks if
the monitoring nodes could not observe whether the node is not an attacker. Further to
this, the same authors [95] implemented an IDS specification-based which targets rank,
local repairs, sinkhole, DIS and neighbour attacks. They employed a group monitoring
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structure, where the network is split into multiple clusters. The IDS is located at the head
of each cluster to monitor the cluster based on the configured role to reduce computation
and storage. The head cluster sends requests periodically to all cluster members; each
member responds with parent information, neighbour lists, and rank information. Their
result shows that IDS can be detected more effectively than network attacks with a slight
amount of overhead.
The authors of [96] propose an efficient, secure route optimisation protocol for the
Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6). The presented protocol enhanced the existing routing pro-
tocol (PMIPv6) when using security, specifically when using authentication, complete
forward secrecy, key exchange and privacy when supporting the protocol mutual. Their
approach provided secure transmission and reduced packet loss, latency and delay. The
authors of [97] proposed a novel trust mechanism which was implemented in a test bed ex-
periment based on the SecTrust-RPL routing protocol. The proposed protocol SecTrust-RPL
provides detection against sybil and rank attacks. However, the authors did not evaluate
the impact of their approach in terms of performance, energy consumption, and perfor-
mance overhead. A recent study in [98] presents a wormhole attack detection mechanism
for the IoT routing protocol RPL. Their IDS placed at the border router (BR) as well as the
host sensor nodes. They evaluated the impact of their IDs on the success rate for detecting
the wormhole attack. Contiki OS simulation with three random typologies consists of 8, 16
and 24 sensor nodes among different run time. The result showed that the true positive
rate was 96% with eight sensor nodes and decreases with the increase of sensor nodes to
around 87%. The authors did not evaluate the impact of their IDs in terms of performance.
They considered only the detection accuracy; furthermore, they detected only one specific
type of attack rather than examine a range of attacks. Recently, a study in [99] proposed
a hybrid IDS target the sinkhole and cloneID attacks and evaluated their ID impact in
terms of performance and detection. The study was an extension of SVELTE and focused
on improving the detection rate of false positive alarms. The authors claimed that the
detection rate was 100%. However, the figures show that a detection rate decrease followed
the increase in sensor nodes. Furthermore, the authors identified that the energy and
power consumption was higher than the SVELTE. Currently, a study in [100] proposes
IDS against a blackhole attack on routing protocol RPL. The authors aimed to improve
detection efficiency by analysing only the suspected node rather than exploring all the
nodes traffic as watchdog approaches do. However, the study limited the evaluation to
address only the accuracy of their IDs.
Unlike intrusion detection on the Internet of Things, the authors of [101] implemented
an intrusion detection framework and architecture that was an RPL-based IIoT that used
genetic programming. Their detection approach targets two kinds of attack: in the version
number and hello flood attacks, and they simulate the network in the Contiki OS. Their
detection system shows that for the flood attack, 96.08% and 99.83% are the worst and
the most accurate, respectively. The values were obtained by collecting data in the 500 ms
and 5000 consecutive ms periods. The attack version number showed a performance
closer to it in flood attack in different periods. The best and worst accuracy obtained with
time intervals was 4000 ms (99.42%) and 3000 ms (97.97%), respectively. Although they
investigated that genetic programming achieved high accuracy and low false positive in
detecting intrusions, they restricted their investigation to only detection accuracy rather
than examining the impact of their intrusion mechanism on performance such as energy
and memory consumption. Table 3 shows the classification of intrusion detection systems
for IoT network layer.
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Table 3. Classification of intrusion detection systems for IoT network layer.
Ref Detection Technique Security Threats Validation Advantages Disadvantages
[89] Lightweight IDS DoS attack Simulation (Qualnet) Evaluates the energy consumption. Does not evaluate the accuracy.
Use only one metric and one attack.
[90] Centralised Malicious attacks RaspberryPi High accuracy rate.
Much faster than Wu-Manber.
High overhead.
[91] Distributed Snikhole attack - High accuracy rate. High false-positive.
Does not address the impact of their
IDS on energy consumption.
[92] Hybrid Snikhole and Selective
forwarding attacks
Cooja-ContikiOS High accuracy rate and Low
overhead.
High false alarm rate 38%
[93] Centralised Wormhole attack Cooja-ContikiOS High true-positive when the
network size small.
the true-positive significantly
decreases by the increase of
network size.
Evaluates only one metric and
one attack.
[94] Distributed Repair and rank attack Not available Effectively detects rank and
repair attacks.
Does not validate their approach on
a simulation.
[95] Centralised Rank local repair, and
sinkhole attacks
Cooja-ContikiOS High detection accuracy Low
false-positive.
Slight overhead.
[96] - Authentication key exchange
and privacy
AVISSPA Reduces latency and packet delay. -
[97] Distributed Sybil and rank attack Cooja-ContikiOS Capable of detecting sybil and
rank attacks.
Does not evaluate the impact of
their approach in terms
of performance.
[98] Hybrid Wormhole attack Cooja-ContikiOS High detection rate sufficient for
constrained resources.
Detects only one attack.
[99] Hybrid Sinkhole-CloneID attacks Cooja-ContikiOS High detection rate. High energy and
power consumption.
[100] Anomaly Blackhole attack Cooja-ContikiOS Improves detection rate. Packet delivery ratio decreases
when the network size increases.
Sensors 2021, 21, 3654 19 of 29
Table 3. Cont.
Ref Detection Technique Security Threats Validation Advantages Disadvantages
[101] centralised Version number and hello
flood attacks
Cooja-ContikiOS High accuracy detection.
Low false-positive alarms
Evaluates only one metric which
detection accuracy.




Outsider attacks ARP posing
and MITM attacks
NS3 and Python script Detects outsider attacks with zero
false-positive.
Not able to detect insider attacks.
[103] Anomaly Malicious traffic Discrete Markov Chainmodels (DTMC) Evaluates the DTMC on differentindustrial datasets.
High number of unknown
transactions and states.
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Another study in [102] implemented a detection mechanism for an industrial control
system called HAMIDS, a hierarchical monitoring intrusion detection system. They em-
ploy a behaviour detection approach to the SCADA water treatment system application.
The most important module is the Bro IDS sensor, which works on receiving data from the
store in logs containing various network protocols such as UDP, TCP, Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) and EtherNet/IP. These logs are collected in the HAMIDS framework, then
the components and results of IDS upon detecting threats from the raw records. The re-
sults show that the HAMIDS was able to detect outsider attacks with zero false positives.
However, HAMID was still vulnerable to insider attacks such as DoS and MITM attacks
level 0 specific threats to SCADA in realistic ICS such as Reboot Ethernet and CPU crashes.
In the industrial IoT ecosystems, communication models among the devices are crucial for
employing security such as anomalies detection and possible cyber-attacks. A study in [103]
proposes a deep packet inspection based on discrete-time Markova chain models (DTMC)
to four types of industrial networks datasets: energy management system, large-scale
water treatment, small-scale water testbed and an electrical substation. The study evaluates
the DTMC model’s impact on the industrial network’s datasets among various industrial
communication protocols such as DNP3, EtherNet/IP and Modbus/TCP. While testing the
data, the DTMC model’s potential was classified as unknown state, unknown transition
and anomalous probability. The results show that the Energy System Monitor (ESM) dataset
did not detect any unknown probabilities for two channels out of six. While for one of
the channels, it observed a high number of transitions and states 248 and 479, respectively.
In contrast, the power generation testbed dataset (PGT) did not observe any unknown
probabilities and states (for the single state transitions). Afterwards, the maximum number
of unknown probabilities 5 and unknown transitions 15 were observed. While the Water
Plant Testbed (WPT) dataset had the highest number of unknown probabilities, 111 and
17.3 on average were of unknown transition. It is clear that more investigation is needed
due to the high number of unknown transactions and states observed in all three datasets.
It is clear from Table 3 that most studies concentrate mainly on insider attacks, while
outsider attacks from the Internet must be studied and examined. As can be shown, attacks
above the network layer have not been thoroughly studied. This clearly demonstrates
that the transport and application layers of the Internet of Things will be vulnerable to
attack, and IoT mentioned in the news because of DDoS attacks. For example, in 2016,
the DNS provider that supported the internet services and platforms, including PayPal,
VISA and Twitter, was attacked by DDoS through the vulnerabilities of IoT devices such
as IP cameras, Printers and residential gateways that were infected by malware named
Miria [8]. Another issue regarding IoT security research that the majority of authors keep
their implementations’ source codes private. It will benefit the field of IoT security research
if researchers share their implementation with the public.
7.3. Transport and Application Layer Security Solutions
The authors of [104,105] presented a security analysis between MQTT and CoAP with
a specific focus on the transport protocol utilised MQTT with TLS and CoAP with DTLS.
Furthermore, the comparative examination took into account security modes such as Raw
Public Key, Certificates and Pre-Shared Key. The analysis shows that MQTT does not
support RPK. However, it acts as a varied security alternative to lightweight and PSKs
certificates. Nevertheless, the old certificate-based encryption and authentication offers
the top level of security. Moreover, the use of certificates can make the HTTP more secure
under different types of attack, as has already been proven. The authors of [106] applied
RSA cryptography on sensing devices by using particular trusted-platform modules (TPM).
They evaluated their system in terms of latency, energy consumption and memory based
on a DTLS cipher suite TLS-RSA-with-AES-128-CBC-SHA. Further to this [107], the same
proposal was described and further evaluated using an experiment in wireless sensor
networks (WSN). Another study in [108] proposes an authentication security scheme
for the transport layer using the ECC algorithm. They present DTLS implementation in
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the context of system architecture to achieve a low overhead and high interoperability.
However, the results show that the handshake mechanism consumes higher energy because
of the ECC algorithm’s complex computation. In contrast, the authors of [109] proposed
an integrated DTLS with CoAP for IoT called Lithe. The authors propose a novel DTLS
header compression scheme that aims to significantly reduce the header overhead of DTLS
leveraging the 6LoWPAN standard. The authors evaluate their scheme based on cipher
suite-based TLS-PSK-WITH-AES-128-CCM to reduce energy consumption and the round
trip time using Contiki OS. The results show that Lithe is more efficient in many aspects than
basic plain CoAP/DTLS. However, the proposed scheme lacks security against the DoS
attack due to the DTLS cookie exchange scheme, which is insufficient to handle this type of
attack, as the authors of [29] reported employing DTLS is a security solution that could
only serve the security issues between UDP running on different endpoints. Still, it cannot
protect the IP header when packets are transmitted through the access network layer of IoT
objects through the internet. Nevertheless, they employed the DTLS protocol to reduce
the number of transition bytes rather than secure the transmission through the IoT devices.
In a similar study to Lithe, the authors of [110] present a lightweight DTLS for IoT called
E-Lithe. They customise the DTLS packet to reduce energy consumption and execution
time to reduce the DTLS computation overhead. The results show that energy and response
time’s performance was reduced slightly more than in [109] study. It is essential to provide
integrity and authentication security for IoT applications. The authors of [111] proposed
identity-based lightweight encryption and a Diffie–Hellman encryption scheme for a smart
home without using a digital certificate, in which case the public keys are only identity
strings. This scheme is divided through the encryption process into data encryption and
key encryption to gain more efficiency and reduce communication costs. The results show
that the data ciphertext is transmitted several times without assigning the key ciphertext.
Likewise, the performance analysis shows that the combination scheme of Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE) and Diffie–Hellman have reduced the communication overhead by nearly
one-third. It performs better than the symmetric IBE scheme in speeding up the encryption
operations. In comparison, authors in [112] propose “integrity security” for Smart Home
applications based on the CoAP protocol. They aim to add the optimal hash function to
the CoAP protocol. They implemented and evaluated their study using Contiki. The result
shows that the secure Hash Algorithm (SHA224) is the most optimal algorithm with CoAP
when optimising power consumption and time. While the hash function algorithms do not
intervene in the encryption/authentication. In the smart-home system terminology, data
confidentiality is crucial due to many data transactions in the smart-home system. A similar
study in [113] proposes a new architecture to secure CoAP, a smart-home application based
on cryptography algorithms, based on AES and SHA224, instead of the traditional security
for CoAP, which is based on DTLS. The study provides data confidentiality and integrity
considering the constrained IoT device’s restriction in energy and execution time. However,
the study does not compare their results with the traditional implementation of CoAP
with DTLS. It appears that much research into securing CoAP protocol based on DTLS
has been proposed, designed and implemented. Another study in [114] proposes secure
CoAPs communication between the IoT devices in 6LoWPAN and smartphones. They
evaluated the performance of the DTLS using the ECC. The use of complex computation
when performing the ECC algorithm led to higher energy consumption.
In conclusion, considering the shortcomings, threats, cryptography-based security
solutions and published research, there are still many problems to investigate in order to
achieve a secure system, as highlighted in Table 4. There is a need to propose lightweight
security algorithms by optimising algorithms such as DTLS and AES to support resource-
constrained devices. Another issue mentioned above regarding IoT security research is
that most authors keep their implementations’ source codes private. It will benefit the field
of IoT security research if researchers share their implementation with the public.
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Table 4. Classification of IoT security solution for transport and application.
Ref Security Objective Proposed Solution Simulation/Testbed Advantages Disadvantages
[104,105] Security analysis for MQTT-TLS
and CoAP with DTLS
Authentication key exchange
and security privacy
- Compares the security
mechanisms for MQTT and
CoAP protocols.
[106] Provides message integrity and
confidentiality with low
overhead and latency
DTLS based on x.509 certificate
containing RSA keys




[107] Provides data confidentiality,
integrity with low overhead and
high interoperability
integrated DTLS handshake and
RSA key, and DTLS with ECC
Real IoT system - -
[108] Provides authentication security
and secure communication
DTLS with ECC public key
authentication
TinyOS Consumes higher energy due to
the complexity computation of
ECC algorithm
[109] Reduces the energy
consumption for the integration
of CoAP with DTLS






[110] Lightweight security against
DoS attack
Uses Trusted Third Party
between the constrained node
and CoAP server
Cooja-ContikOS Reduce the energy and
respond time
-
[111] Lightweight encryption for
smart-home based on public key
Cryptography solution based on
stateful Diffie Hellman key and
identity-based
encryption scheme
- Reduce the computational cost
of encryption implementation
-
[112] Message integrity security for
smart-home application
integrated hash functions with
CoAP protocol
Cooja-ContikiOS Provides integrity protection Does not provide data
confidentiality. In the
terminology of smart-home
system, the data transactions
being leaked
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Table 4. Cont.
Ref Security Objective Proposed Solution Simulation/Testbed Advantages Disadvantages
[113] Data confidentiality, integrity,
and authentication for
smart-home application
Cryptography solution based on
integrated CoAP-AES and
CoAP-ShA2
Cooja-ContikiOS Provides data confidentiality,
integrity, and
authentication protection
Does not evaluate their solution
performance with DTLS
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8. Open Research Challenges
Although other studies might not be mentioned, this study provides a comprehensive
overview of IoT security included in IoT layers, attacks, solutions, limitations and counter-
measure studies in the literature. There are still many issues to be studied and solved with
future research. As such, the following is some potential work that could be investigated
in the future:
• The IoT devices have a limited processing capability, memory and storage, which
they need to operate at low power. Security methods that demand heavy encryption
are not suitable for constrained devices due to the complexity of encryption and
decryption operations for transmitting data quickly and securely. Thus, lightweight
encryption algorithms are needed for constrained devices, including actuators and
sensors. Communication between these devices must be protected and provide
integrity and confidentiality using hash functions and the AES.
• The implementation of the IDS in IoT networks presents new challenges, as it generates
a large number of false alerts. It is a challenge to provide real-time IoT-IDSs and extend
the range of attacks detection and consider the impact of the IDS on IoT devices’
performance regarding overhead, energy consumption and accuracy.
• The new era of Industry 4.0 and industrial IoT requires designing a novel intru-
sion detection methodology to guarantee the protection of connected systems and
provided services.
• Prevention mechanisms for specific attacks to the IIoT environment such as smart
grid, transportation, smart industry etc., need further development.
• Developing a lightweight security scheme for the smart grid application based on less
computation algorithm suitable for constrained devices.
9. Conclusions
The new technology of IoT is enabling physical network connectivity and computing
capability of sensors and control system to generate, exchange and consume data with
minimal human interaction. This survey has presented various security threats at different
IoT layers, including security challenges and solutions regarding the end-to-end IoT envi-
ronment. It has covered the security issues related to the network layer, middleware layer,
communication protocols and application layer. Further, it has provided a critical analysis
of existing IoT solutions based on different security mechanisms, including cryptography
and IDSs. The state-of-the-art IoT security has also been discussed with some of the future
research directions to enhance IoT security levels. This survey is expected to become a
roadmap toward security enhancement for IoT industrial applications.
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